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States, 8 the court found error in not informing him of his ineligibility
for parole, and placed the onus on the government of proving the guilty
plea to have been voluntary with an understanding of the conse-
quences.3 9 Argument by the government that sentence was well within
what Bye could have expected even with parole,40 and that his claim of
being unaware of the "consequences" was "incredible" 41 were both
dismissed on the weight of Berry.42
Obviously, underestimation, by a multiple of three, of time to be
served is a significant "consequence" within the meaning of Rule 11,
regardless of what might be the expectation of a defendant. The attitude
of the government appears to have been to prosecute solely for the sake
of prosecution itself. But, the court has aligned itself with the majority
rule43 and refused to allow Bye's ignorance of a relatively obscure sec-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code 44 deprive him of just treatment.45
APPELLATE REVIEw - ABUSE OF DISCRETION
On the night of April 20, 1969 Timothy J. Hart, then 18 years old
and an honor student in his freshman year at Syracuse University on a
full scholarship, was killed in an automobile accident while riding as a
passenger in the auto of appellant, Charles N. Forchelli. The action was
(Ist Cir. 1969); Munich v. United States, 887 F.2d 356, 860-61 (9th Cir. 1964). The court
did not find its holding in United States v. Caruso, 280 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
aff'd sub nom. United States v. Mauro, 399 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 894 US.
904 (1969), to be inconsistent. In Mauro, the record fully rebutted all allegations of
unawareness. 280 F. Supp. at 375.
38 412 F.2d 189, 191 (3d Cir. 1969). See note 26 supra. Contra, Smith v. United States,
824 F.2d 486, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
39 The general view among the circuits was that failure to inform defendant of such
consequences could constitute harmless error, if it could be established the defendant
was aware of the consequences of his plea at the hearing on motion for post conviction
relief. 41 TEMP. L.Q. 491, 496 n.26 (1968). However, the Supreme Court, in Mc Carthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), stated that failure to comply with Rule 11 was pre-
judicial per se. 594 U.S. at 468-72. See Heiden v. United States, 858 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1965).
40435 F.2d at 180. The government pointed out that Bye had been informed of a
20 year maximum sentence on each count which, had he received such, and had parole
been available, would have made him eligible for parole in 13!/3 years. Since he had
received only 15 years total and could conceivably be released afted 10 years with full
credit for good time, the government felt "that there was no justification in allowing Bye
an opportunity for a shorter incarceration period.
41 The court found it more credible to have a person expect the usual treatment of
parole. 845 F.2d at 181, citing, 41 Tmp. L.Q. 491, 496 (1968).
42 Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 1969).
43 Cases cited note 25 supra.
44 See note 83 supra. Formerly INT. R.v. CoDE of 1954, § 7237(d).
45 One might make the argument that Bye should not be entitled to use of his
expectation of parole to promote his case for vacating sentence. The government does
so argue, and yet attempts to use his expectation of sentence to their advantage. However,




originally brought by Lucie Dolores Hart, Timothy's mother, as ad-
ministratrix of goods, chattels and credits of the deceased. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, trying the
case before a jury, held the defendant-appellant negligent in an un-
reported decision and awarded the plaintiff-appellee damages of
$252,000. An appeal was sought on the sole issue of whether the damages
awarded by the jury were excessive.46 In a per curiam decision 7 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
findings of the lower court and held that the amount awarded was not
so unreasonably excessive as to justify the court's intervention.48
The court was faced with the basic question of what is "the scope of
review in the appellate courts in examing the excessiveness of a jury
verdict." 49 To be sure, the question is neither novel nor easily answered.
It has long been held that federal trial courts certainly have the dis-
cretion to review a jury verdict in determining whether a new trial
should be granted or refused on the grounds of inadequate or excessive
judgments., The difficulties are encountered in the consideration of
whether an appellate court has the power to review the trial court's
grant or refusal of a new trial.5 ' The basis of the conflict is rooted in
English common law practices52 and need not concern the reader of
this paper. Suffice it to say that there has customarily existed a lack of
46 Neither the jury's finding that appellant was negligent nor any other factual deter-
mination was contested at the court of appeals' level. Hart v. Forchelli, 445 F.2d 1018
(2d Cir. 1971).
47 Id.
48 Some further facts are needed to understand the impact of appellant's contention
of excessive damages. At the time of the accident the plaintiff, Mrs. Hart, was forty-one
years of age, in excellent health and had a life expectancy of thirty-five years. Some years
before the accident she had been abandoned by her husband and had secured employment
at the Catholic House of Retreat in Willimantic, Connecticut at a weekly salary of $75.
Evidence was produced at the trial that decedent planned to become an attorney and
had indicated his intention to support his mother upon completion of his legal education.
The realization of this hope was six years in the future at the time Timothy was killed.
49 445 F.2d at 1019.
5o See 6A J. MooRa, FEDiEmL PRACncE 59.08[6], at 3821-822 (2d ed. 1971).
51 For a broad discussion of this much disputed question, see generally Blume,
Review of Facts in Jury Cases-The Seventh Amendment, 20 J. AW. Jun. Soc'y 130
(1935); Hinton, Power of Federal Appellate Court to Review Ruling on Motion for New
Trial, 1 U. CHm. .- REv. 111 (1953) Comment, Federal Review of Excessive Verdicts, 30
TExAs L. Rv. 242 (1951); Note, Appealibility of Rulings on Motions for New Trial in
the Federal Courts, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 575 (1950): 65 HAuv. L. REv. 1064 (1952).
52 Traditionally there are four objections to appellate review. These are: 1) the
separation of writ of errors and motion for new trial; 2) prohibitions of the Judiciary
Act of 1789; 3) common law review of the verdict and the seventh amendment of the
United States Constitution; 4) discretion of the trial court. See 6A J. MooRE, supra
note 50, at 3825-28. Each of these objections is analyzed in its technical ramifications in
Comment, Federal Appellate Review of Excessive or Inadequat'e Damage Awards, 28 Fo, .
L. R v. 500 (1959).
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power in appellate courts to review a trial court's order refusing or
granting a motion to set aside a verdict on the sole ground that it is ex-
cessive or inadequate. 53
Until quite recently the Second Circuit recognized no power at
all existing in a federal appellate court to review the verdict of a jury
with respect to damages, be they inadequate or excessive.5 4 It is odd that
this principle persisted so long in our own federal circuit when the
majority of circuits had moved away from it and were in fact allowing a
more liberal attitude with respect to the power of appellate courts to
review such issues. 55 Most of the circuits which allow review of a lower
court's ruling on a motion for new trial based on inadequacy or exces-
siveness of the verdict, utilize the theory that the trial court judge
abused his discretion. 56 This theory has helped many circuits reverse
their previous rule of "no-review" and
the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
and the District of Columbia now recognize that they may reverse
a judgment even though the only basis for review is the in-
adequacy or excessiveness of the verdict.57
However, so tenaciously had the Second and Eighth Circuits maintained
their position that they were termed "the most adamant expounders"5'
of non-reviewability. 50 But the trend away from non-reviewability com-
menced in 1956, when the Second Circuit moved toward the majority
53 See 6A J. MOORE 59.08 at 3825.
54 Certainly the position that there is no power of review is bolstered by a series of
cases in the Second Circuit: Maher v. Isthmian Steamship Co., 253 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1958);
Stevenson v. Hearst Consol. Publications, 214 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1954); Kennair v. Mississippi
Shipping Co., 197 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1952); Nagle v. Isbrandtsen Co., 177 F.2d 163 (2d
Cir. 1949); Stornelli v. United States Gypsum Co., 134 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied., 319 U.S. 760 (1943); Powers v. Wilson 110 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1940); Searfoss v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., 76 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1935); Jacque v. Locke Insulator Corp., 70 F.2d
680 (2d Cir. 1934); Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co., 40 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1930); Ford
Motor Co. v. Hotel Woodward Co., 271 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1921); Press Pub. Co v. Gillette,
229 F. 108 (2d Cir. 1915).
55 See, e.g., Wooley v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 281 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1960);
Siebrand v. Gossnell, 234 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1956); Ballard v. Forbes, 208 F.2d 883 (1st Cir.
1954); Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, Krause v. Bucher,
345 U.S. 997 (1953); Sebring Trucking Co. v. White, 187 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1951); Smith v.
Welch, 189 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1951); Boyle v. Bond, 187 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
Virginia Ry. Co. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948).
56 6A J. MoolE at 3836-39.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 3834.
59 It should be noted here that the Fifth Circuit found rest in neither philosophical
camp. It has wavered from a strict view requiring a verdict to be "inordinate" (Crowell-
Collier Pub. Co. v. Caldwell, 179 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1948)) to the more liberal abuse of
discretion theory employed by other circuits (Gleghorn v. Koontz, 178 F.2d 133 (5th Cir.
1948)).
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
position in the case of Comisky v. Pennsylvania R.R.60 Nevertheless, the
court reaffirmed the position that the matter of excessive damages was, as
had consistently been held, in the trial judge's discretion. However, the
decision showed its wavering in ten words - "though we may review his
decision for abuse of discretion." 61 Subsequently, Professor Moore was
forced to withdraw his characterization of the Second Circuit as an ada-
mant expounder of non-reviewability. Said Professor Moore, "[t]he Sec-
ond Circuit left the camp of adamant expounders of non-reviewability
in Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co."62 In Dagnello63 the court assumed
the abuse of discretion doctrine used by the majority of circuits although
it affirmed the lower court's ruling that the damages were not ex-
orbitant.0 4
The Second Circuit had now liberated itself to review the trial
judge's decision. Recently, this circuit went to the other extreme and,
having ordered the district court to grant the defendant a new trial
unless the plaintiff agreed to remit $105,000 of the award,6 5 was itself
reversed by the United States Supreme Court as having overstepped its
bounds. 60 The Supreme Court felt there was no abuse of discretion.67
It becomes evident that the problem really boils down to what is ex-
60 228 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1956).
61 Id. at 688. A quick reading might have missed this short phrase which merely
pointed the way for what was to come. The rigidity of non-reviewability was removed.
62 6A, J. MooRE at 3834 n.57 (Supp. 1970).
63 289 F.2d 797 (1961).
64 The Dagnello decision although permitting appellate review does so in a very
limited manner. The court held that it had
the power to review the order of the trial judge refusing to set aside a verdict
as excessive. If we reverse, it must be because of an abuse of discretion. If the
question of excessiveness is close or in balance, we must affirm. The very nature
of the problem counsels restraint. Just as the trial judge is not called upon to
say whether the amount is higher than he personally would have awarded, so
are we appellate judges not to decide whether we would have set aside the verdict
if we were presiding at the trial but whether the amount is so high that it would
be a denial of justice to permit it to stand. We must give the benefit of every
doubt to the judgment of the trial judge; but surely there must be an upper
limit, and whether that has been surpassed is not a question of fact with respect
to which reasonable men may differ, but a question of law.
Id. at 806.
O5 Gruenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 388 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 398 U.S. 156
(1969). In this case a foreman of a track gang had his right foot severely crushed in a
work-related incident. He was awarded $305,000 and when the trial judge refused
defendant's motion to set aside the verdict as excessive defendant appealed. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the verdict of $305,000 was
so grossly excessive as to affect the entire case and require a new trial unless
Gruenthal agrees within a reasaonable time to remit so much of the recovery
as exceeds $200,000 (i.e. $105,000). We apply the teaching of Dagnello v. Long
Island R.R. 289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961) and hold, that it would be a denial
of justice to permit this verdict to stand.
388 F.2d at 484.
60 393 U.S. 156 (1969).
6T Id. at 160.
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cessive or as law professors are wont to ask "what is a minute of pain
worth?"6
In the case of Hart v. Forchelli,69 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit looked as objectively as possible at the award of $252,000
which was awarded the plaintiff for the loss of her only son. Despite the
fact that the judgment was large,70 the court felt it was not in the
category of a judgment which was so shocking as to constitute an abuse
of discretion.7 1 Although the Second Circuit did not exercise its power
to reverse in Hart, it made abundantly clear that such power exists.
Juror's Remark. The court, in Grace Lines, Inc. v. Motley,7 2 granted a
petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to grant a
motion to vacate the order for mistrial.7 3 That order was issued on the
basis of a juror's remark74 that she had gone along with the other jurors
in order to make the verdict unanimous.7 5
68 The question of excessiveness seems to be lost in a sea of superlatives. The
standard of what is excessive has received great semantical treatment. To incur appellate
interference courts have held the verdict must be "monstrous" (Affolder v. New York,
Chicago & St. L. R.R. Co., 339 U.S. 96, 101 (1950)); "palpably and grossly inadequate or
excessive" (Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1934)); "fantastic" (La France v. New
York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 292 F.2d 649, 650 (2d Cir. 1961)); "so grossly excessive as to
shock the judicial conscience" (Wooley v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 281 F.2d 78, 80 (3d
Cir. 1960)); "manifest abuse of discretion" (Russell v. Monongattela Ry. Co., 262 F.2d 349,
352 (3d Cir. 1958)); "shockingly excessive" (Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia,
190 F.2d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1951)); "without precedent or sound legal basis" (Crowell-
Collier Pub. Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941, 944 (5th Cir. 1948)). This brief exposd of
subjective semantics should indicate the imprecision which is inherent in this entire
problem of excessiveness.
69445 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1971).
70 An examination of both New York and federal cases indicated that this was one
of the largest awards on record in a wrongful death action with only one surviving relative,
who was not the decedent's spouse. Citing Brown v. Louisiana & Arkansas Ry., 429 F.2d
1265 (5th Cir. 1970), the decision also noted that federal juries are not bound by the
amount that "New York juries have awarded or New York courts have approved or
disapproved." 445 F.2d 1019.
71 To emphasize its contention that the verdict was not excessive the court's opinion
broke the award down to a mathematical formula. Since plaintiff had a life expectancy of
35 years at the time of judgement, if the $252,000 award were placed in an interest
bearing account at six percent with withdrawals to deplete both interest and principal
at the end of her life expectancy the award would amount to $16,500 a year for life.
This the court felt was not an amount so excessive as to permit appellate interference.
72 439 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1971).
73 An order granting a new trial is within the trial court's discretion, but the
appellate courts may reverse, if there is an abuse of such discretion. See Fm. R. Crv. P. 61;
6A J. MooRE, FmEAL PsAcucE 59.05, at 3756 (2d ed. 1970); 52 Am. JuR. 2d Mandamus
§ 343 (1970).
74 Upon polling the jury, Juror No. 11 replied, "Yes it had to be unanimous." The
court asked for an explanation and the juror responded, "The verdict, as I understand,
had to be one hundred percent in favor and we had to present one statement. I was, I
think the only one that held out and there was no possibility of any change and because
of this I did." 439 F.2d at 1030.
75 The right of trial by jury in civil cases over which federal courts have jurisdiction
is guaranteed by the seventh amendment. The phrase "trial by jury" has been inter-
[Vol. 46:499
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The writ was issued on two grounds. First, that since the defendants
had made a motion for a directed verdict during the course of the trial,
under Rule 50(b) they were entitled to have "the verdict and any judg-
ment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in ac-
cordance with his motion for a directed verdict" within ten days after
the discharge of the jury.76 Since the defendant was denied such op-
portunity mandamus will issue to afford it.77
The second ground for the ruling was more far-reaching, although
the three concurring opinions vary slightly as to the applicability of the
principal facts to the precedents involved.7 The question presented is
"whether the motivation of the juror was so unlawful or improper as to
require the court to nullify her vote and therefore the entire verdict." 79
The court answered in the negative.
The leading case concerning this question is McDonald v. Pless,0
which established the rule that a juror may not impeach his own verdict.
preted to include all the essential elements recognized in jury trials at common law.
They are: first, that the jury should consist of twelve men; second, that the jury should
be under the superintendence of a judge who will instruct them as to the law; third, that
the verdict should be unanimous. See 5 J. MooPE, FEmAL PRAC-nCE 38.08, at 84.2
(2d ed. 1971) and cases cited therein. See also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288
(19g0).
76 FE. R. Civ. P. 50(b) The motion must be made within ten days after the jury's
"discharge" since here the declaration of a mistrial nullified the verdict. But the
distinction is only of technical consequence since the moving party is permitted ten days
in either case, be it entry of judgment or no verdict.
77 Generally interlocutory decrees are not appealable because they lack finality. There
is some authority for the exception that such decrees are appealable when a jurisdictional
question is raised. S.M. Hamilton Coal Co. v. Watts, 232 F. 832 (2d Cir. 1916), relying on
Phillips v. Negley, 117 U.S. 665 (1886). But in the principal case there was no question
raised as to the trial court's power to issue the order.
78 Judge Anderson and Judge Lumbard agreed that the trial court had abused its
discretion in declaring a new trial. Judge Waterman was of the view that such a ruling
was unnecessary since the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
had merit. Futhermore, if such a motion was not granted, "the trial judge is cautioned
that we have laid down a procedure to be followed when a juror indicates sufficient
unsureness to endanger a verdict's validity." Grace Lines, Inc. v. Motley, 439 F.2d 1028,
10 4 n.2. Apparently from the use of the word "cautioned" Judge Waterman is implying
that the trial judge had not followed such procedure. But he was reluctant to hold
with the majority because of the "unusual substitution of our interlocutory discretion
for the exercise of the trial judge's discretion:' 439 F.2d at 1034. Judge Anderson also
makes reference to this procedure but implies that such would be unnecessary in light
of the principal facts. Id. at 1032.
79 Id. at 1031.
80238 U.S. 264 (1915). The reasoning is based on the practical ground that jury
verdicts would become unsatisfactorily mutable. Jury tampering would be given a new
field of operation. It should be noted however, that the rule here established is tempered
by the dictum that
it would not be safe to lay down any inflexible rule because there might be
instances in which such testimony of the juror could not be excluded without
violating the plainest principles of justice.
Id. at 268-69.
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However, as the court noted, this does not preclude the juror from
stating in open court, before judgment has been entered, that he does
not agree with the verdict.8' But here that rule is inapposite since the
juror did not state that she did not agree with the verdict but only
stated her reason for concurrence.82
Judge Anderson relied principally on Jorgenson v. York Ice Ma-
chine Corp.s3 where the court stated that
it would be impracticable to impose the counsel of absolute per-
fection that no verdict shall stand, unless every juror has been
entirely without bias, and has based his vote only upon evidence
he has heard in court.8 4
There the jury returned a verdict on the majority view in a 7 to 5
split8 5 Judge Hand went on to state, even if the trial court had in its
discretion granted a motion for a new trial, it would not have been
sustained. 6
In United States v. Grieco,8 7 cited in two opinions, the court
reiterated the same sentiments.
It is not possible to determine mental processes of jurors by the
strict tests available in an experiment in physics; we have to deal
with human beings, whose opinions are inevitably to some extent
subject to emotional controls that are beyond any accessible
scrutiny.88
A majority of the court was of the view that the juror indicated by
her statement that she was not surrendering a conscientious conviction,
but merely had conceded that her judgment well might be erroneous in
light of the findings of the other eleven and therefore joined their judg-
ment as not an unreasonable one. Thus, the majority held that the trial
court "abused its discretion in declaring a mistrial and ordering a new
trial."8 0 As inferred by Judge Lumbard, to rule otherwise would serve
only to facilitate a "needless retrial."
81 In such a situation either the jury will be returned for further consideration or
will be discharged and a new trial ordered. See 6A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 59.08,
at 3796 (2d ed. 1971).
82 439 F.2d at 1031.
83 160 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 US. 764 (1947).
84 Id. at 435.
85 The dissenting jurors agreed to accept the vote of the majority in order to expe-
dite the deliberation when it was learned that a juror's son had been killed in action.
It is apparent that such facts are far more conducive to declaring the verdict null than
in the principal case yet the court emphatically refused to do so.
80 160 F.2d at 435. See note 77 supra.
87 261 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907 (1959).
88 Id. at 415-16.
89 439 F.2d at 1032.
[Vol. 46:499
